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Arerican Unions and the Fture of Worker Representation
IN0UOCTIC
The cp anicn papers in this volume docmt clearly the crisis
facing the Aerican labor movement. 7e dimensions of the decline in
memrbership, political influence, organization and representation
therefore need not be repeated here. Instead, in this paper we only wish
briefly to cment on the iplications of these develpcments for Aerican
society, and on the prospects arnd tions for the future of worker
representation in the economic and political affairs of the nation.
IMPLICATIONS OF IABOR'S ~CLINE
Historians will record the accelerated decline of organized labor in
the 1980s as perhaps the rmost visible indicator of a slide in the
performance of the traditional American irdustrial relations system.
Moreover, the nmagnitde of this recent decline and the trajectory it
suggests for the future are sufficient to threaten the viability of the
labor rmovement as a significant political voice and eormic force for
American workers. Not since the end of the 1920s has labor been so
threatened.
If we continue to believe that labor's voice in political affairs is a
sine uo non of a democratic society, the stakes for the nation as a
whole are considerable. But we risk more than just the loss of an
imrportant political and social movement. Given the centrality of unions
to the collective bargainin process and the elusive dePerKr of our
industrial relations system on collective bargaining, the decline of
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organized labor also implies a weakening of the founation for diocratic
worker representation at the workplace. Thus, it is disturbing that
there has been very little seriouas political debate over the
consequences of the continued decline of labor. If such a debate is not
initiated soon, historians will also reoord the current period as a time
in which we passively witnessed the erosion of one of the crucial
democratic institutions of American society, without oonsidering its long
term implications.
Like the other authors in this volume, we believe that strong and
effective institutions for worker representation are essential not only
to a democratic society but also to the nation's economic progress.
Organized labor's role has always been to make sure that worker interests
are adequately taken into acrmt in the economic and political choices
that shape employrent practices and Artcnes. Labor's role is most
critical precisely at times like the present, when fudamental changes in
product and labor markets require national policy makers and inrdividual
firms to make equally furdamental choices about how to adjust to these
dynamics. The absence of a strorng labor voice in these choices creates a
vacuum that allows eployers to focus on other more powerful constraints
while worker interests beoe merely residual considerations. Those
advanced irndustrial nations that have been most suocessful in
international markets are promoting high quality goods and services
requiring flexible methods of organizing both production and work. For
instance, the last fifteen years have seen a celebration of the so-called
"small states" of Western Eurcpe (e.g., Austria, Belgium, Denmark), which
are highly dependent on exports and therefore have no choice but to rely
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on highly skilled, high wage labor prg high labor-value-added goods
and services (Katzenstein, 1985). Mhis choice uses the quality of labor
inpt as a pcerful crparative advantage in international markets.
Other Western European camtries and regio of ountries (e.g., the
Federal Republic of Germany, parts of northern Italy) have adopted
similar strategies. In all these cases, sectoral an/or national
competitiveness has been achieved in spite of (or is it because of?.)
significant participation by the institutions of worker representation in
the organization of production, training and adjustment, arnd work (c.f.,
Thelen, 1989; Wever, 1990).
We argue that if Americans continue to value a high and growing
standard of living and to seek the minimization of inoxe disparities, we
too will need to make considerably more coroerted efforts to promote such
high standard irdustries, firms and cxapetitive strategies. The evidenoe
from abroad shows thatmost often extensive worker representation and
labor participation in strategic managerial decision making, in
organizing skills and trainirg programs (i.e., internal labor markets)
and managing flexibility in the allocation of human resoures across
firms and irdustries (i.e., external labor markets) play important roles
in sustaining these successful economic strategies. To the extent that
these experiences are generalizable, this may mean that the decline of
the U.S. labor mrement is associated not only with a weakenir of
democracy, but also with a declining staard of living and serious
potential constraints on r nation's capacity to regain leadership
status in the world econny (c.f., Apel arnd akalick, 1988; Mhelen, 1989;
Maase et al, 1975; Windolf 1989).
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Therefore, this paper starts with the proposition that American
society faces an important challenge in this decade. It must rebuild
effective institutions for worker representation by sport/i a
resurgence of the existing labor movement as rrety structured, by
creating new institutions for eployes reprse ntaticn, or by same
ccmbination of the two approaches. Our purpose here is to outline the
changes needed to restructure institutions of worker representation that
can function effectively in a modern eooy, the oditiaos needed to
produce these changes ad the likelihood of this type of transformation
in worker representation.
The argurent advanced here can be summarized as follows. It is never
wise to extrapolate very far into the future any continuation of past
trends in the growth and decline of the labor movement. H er, past
reversals of trerds in the labor movement have been rooted in a
confluence of forces, sane within ard sane outside of labor's control.
If history is any guide, a significant reversal of labor's decline will
require fudaental shifts in: (1) the do mestic conmic and political
environment, (2) labor law, and (3) union strategy. A resurgence of
worker representation cannot and will not ocr in a vacuum. Just as its
decline is tied to dcarnges in international markets that led to a broader
collapse of the traditional U.S. idustrial relations system, so too must
its resurgence be linked to a transformation of overall industrial
relations practices and institutions capable of taking on traditional
political and unfamiliar social and economic functions. We believe that
at least in principle, labor can be a catalyst for change in the social,
political, econcmic and legal arenas, but that such change hinges on the
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articulation and representation of interests not currently on labor's
agenda, and on the mobilization of cxostituencies not currently in the
domain of the American unionsm.
SYSTEMIC SCUCES OF UNIONC ECLINE
She previos dapters have discussed a variety of cmr eoxlanations
for the decline of unions in the U.S. he usual suspects, tb ly
examined here, include: structural charqes in the econry; shifts in
employer strategies, which deter organizing or reduce worker incentives
to organize; the erosion of labor laws and of their enforcement; and
shifting worker demograhics, values, anrd attitudes toward collective
representation. Numerous empirical stdies have domented the specific
effects of each of these factors. But hile these causes of union
merbership decline are often marshalled as ideperent explanations, we
and car colleagues have argued in earlier work (Kodan, Katz, and
M=Kersie, 1986) that all of thes are highly interdeperdent cp0cnents of
a broader transformation of the envi ernt and instutional features of
American irdustrial relations. Csider, for example, the following
interdependencies.
Between the erd of World War II and about the first oil crisis of the
early 1970's, American unions in many key sectors were able to "take
wages out of competition", thus removing the incentive for any individual
employer to lower labor costs. But in traditional unionized sectors,
enviroental charge have icreased price cpetitin and created the
need for greater flexibility in the allocation of reseuroes, includinr
human resouroes. Traditional U.S. collective bargaining contracts,
however, far from allowing for flexible work organization, in fact
6
rigidify internal labor markets. Corsequently, employers have reduced
emplaynent in their highest labor cost units and shifted investments to
low wage facilities both in the U.S. ard abroad. he decentralized
nature of collective bargainirx in the U.S. had two critical negative
effects on the labor moverent. First, it limited union leaders' acess
to the decision making forums in which these resr e allocation
strategies are developed. As a result, American firms could reallocate
resources and jobs to nonunion envirYnents, in which major conflicts
with unions can be avoided. Seoond, it meant that union and nonunion
enterprises crmpeted in the same markets and often the same regions,
placing economic strains due to high union labor costs on unionized
employers, and granting a powerful capetitive advantage to nonunion
employers who also were more free to allocate labor flexibly. That is,
decentralized, firm-by-firm bargaining made it impossible for labor to
take wages out of competition under the changed international econinic
circmrstanoes. his provided even greater incentives for employers to
shift resources to nonunion operations. Both of these factors
contributed to the loss of union jbs.
As workers lost union jobs, their unions were no longer functional to
them, union mentership no longer appeared instrunmental, and they had
little reason to carry any cairtment or loyalty to the union over into
their new jobs. For essentially three reasons, those workers who
obtained the jobs created in this reallocation showed little interest in
unionizing. First, the "demonstration effect" of declining job security
for current union members reduced the perceived instrumentality of
joining a union. Because American unions generally lack- the power to
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protect mmbers against layoffs in severe economic crises, and lack the
capacity to help workers find new jobs on the (external) labor market,
they often beccme identified with particular eplaynt ins ty ard
uncertainty. Secomd, because of American unions' economistic or "bread
and butter" focus, workers had no other basis on which to maintain union
mnibership once out of work or working at a rmnion enterprise. Until
very recently, unions offered no ueership status outside of a
collective bargaini relationship. reover, American unions have
traditionally shied away from claims to represent members' political or
social interests. hird, some employers paoure substantial resauroes
into designing their new facilities to both maximize flexibility and
avoid unionization, so that many workers found these new job envirnments
quite responsive to their job related interests. Therefore, the
conditions for unionization--jcb dissatisfaction and instrumentality
perceptions that previously might have interested a majority of workers
in joining a union-were often absent in these new settings. As a result
of these three factors, workers who lost union jobs had neither any
social, econoic or political incentives actively to seek continued union
meixership, nor any practical option to do so.
A similar dynamic severely constraned union penetration into white
collar jobs and the service industries. hite collar workers have
historically been less interested in unions than blue collar workers, and
have reported higher levels of job satisfaction than blue collar workers.
Eplyers have traditionally been even more resistant to white collar
unionization than to blue collar unionization, and new employers are
typically more resistant to unionization than partially or highly
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unionized employers. Moreover, marry service sector employees are far
more loyal to their careers than to the crpanies they work for. As a
result, the fact that union mnbership is generally tied to individual
firms (except in some craft unions; i.e., does rot "travel" across jobs
in different firms, as it does in most other advanced irustrial
countries) maans that even if they can organize more people in this
sector, unions will continue to lose many of their mnbers when they
charnge eployers (which particularly these kinds of eplyees frequently
do) .
In sumrary, these occupational ard sectoral shifts, cibined with the
emergence within manufacturing sectors of new high technology industries
that eploy high percentages of white collar and technical workers,
greatly contributed to union nermbership declines. Contributing to the
labor movement's inability to stem this decline were unions' association
with rigid internal labor markets, their lack of any significant
institutional presence in external labor markets, their inability to
influence decisions in strategic management or to take wages out of
competition, and the instrumental and workplace-specific nature of union
membership in the U.S.
The backdrop against which all these labor and product market
developments took place was an increasingly conservative political
environment and the decreasing effectiveness of labor laws designed to
deter employer resistance to unions in organizing campaigns. Labor was
unable to counter these political and legal develpments with legislative
or administrative reforms. he probability of being punished for using
illegal union avoidance tactics diminished as the political and social
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envira ent ea ore tolerant of open employer opposition to unions,
and as the legal system became less effective in canmteri emplyer
resistance to unions. The lack of any broadly shared public aonmitment
to labor as an important social and political t further Car3d
labor's loss of influene in national politics. Mhen unions tried to
regain their influence or to reform labor laws, they were labeled
"special interests" concerned only with their institutional seaurity,
rather than being seen as a broad socio-political mvement protectirg
furdamental worker rights. This confluene of social, political and
legal developnents also contributed to the unions' inability to recoup
membership losses through traditional union organizing strategies (c.f.,
Weiler, 1990).
The central implication of these dynamics is that no single strategy
and no incremental envirarental change is likely to produce a resurgence
for the American union~ mvement. Instead, any significant increase in
the proportion of the workforce represented by labor organizations must
be based on furdamental transformations in the envirorent, in the
institutional structures of idustrial relations, and in the strategies
used to represent workers.
Other historical turning points in the history of the American labor
moverent support this notion. In the 1930s a decde-lon decline of
union mmneership was reversed only after transformations in the political
envirorrent, labor law and the strategies and the structures of the labor
mrvement. First, liberal political forces took per out of the hands of
conservatives. Second, a new collective bgaining law established and
protected workers' rights to organize and thereby provided a higher
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degree of stability to union mnmbership. And third, the advent of
industrial unionism ushered in a new strategy for organizing and
representing the interests of blue collar production workers regardless
of their skill levels. The surge of unionization was accepted (albeit
only grudgingly arnd tacitly) by most eployers, who gained frma the nw
"system" in that unins minimized roduct disruptions by channelig
labor unrest, and enhanced productivity by structuri ntnal labor
markets.
The 1960s saw a similar sea change in the political and legal
enviroment and in union strategies in the public sector. President
Kennedy issued an executive order in 1962 that for the first time
endorsed the right of federal workers to organize and be represented by a
union in dealing with their gaovenental emplayers. his was followed by
the gradual enactment of laws in over two thirds of the states which
provided collective bargaining rights to employees of local and state
governents. The political and social climate changed as we saw urban
turmoil sparked by the civil rights and Vietnam War protests, and both
public and private sector unions began organizing public sector workers
for the purpose of collective bargaining (thoah in most cases workers
lacked the right to strike or to bargain ao rding to the machanisms of
the private sector model). Employer resistance to unions was minimized
by the fact that the employers in this case were g ental agencies
who were not as insulated as private sector employers from the force of
liberal public opinion. hus, as in the 1930s, it was the oanflueoe of
a variety of social, econcmic ard political foroes that allowed for a
reversal in union membership trends.
11
We now turn to a discission of the alternative strategies currently
being debated ad applied in the interest of rebuilding A rican worker
representation. We break this sonment into three parts, focusing first
on the challenges iPlied by irustrial shifts and de-,a3ihic dteares,
seorxd an the jiperativ es of new manage t stra ies and organizational
structures, and finally on the values and expectations of the worforoe.
ALTPNTE ST% G FM TBOR PnaR I 'i-ON
Irdustrial Shifts and the Cainr E lorent Mix:
Any strategy for a resurgene in worker representation ust start by
addressing the shift of jobs frun traditional manufacturing and blue
collar o pations to white collar ad service sector jobs. In the
U.S., ninety percent of the new jobs and 67% percent of all jcbs are now
in the service economy. Yet until recently unions have continued to
focus their organizing efforts on the more familiar but shrinking
manufacturing workforoe. Betwn 1974 and 1985, for example, only 22% of
union representation elections were held in the service sector (McDonald,
1985). Data from 1986-88 show that approcimately 45% of all
representation elections occurred in manufacturi -twice its proportion
of the labor force. Efforts to organize manufacturing persist despite
the higher election win rates in service irdustries, especially health
services. For example, between 1986 and 1988 unions won only 41% of
elections held in manufacturing pared to 53% in services and health
care. hus, while there has been sme shift toward organizing services,
there remains a terdency to conoentrate on familiar but less fertile
territory.
In any case, the nmber of organizing efforts overall is still too
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smal, and the approac too conventional to yield significant gains among
service sector eployees. Union leaders mronly estimate the cost of
signing up one new union merber to at the very least $1,000. QCurrently,
12% of private sector workers are organized in the U.S. Based on their
estimates of future labor force grwth and union job loss, OCaison and
Ihavale (1990) estimate that the labor vent wuld have to organize
about 320,000 nerw members every year, at a total annual cost of over $300
million, just in order to stay even at 12% representation in the private
sector. This represents more than six times the number of people
currently being organized through NLRB elections. These numbers are well
beyond the labor movement's organizing capabilities and financial
reSOurces.
Even if this task were financially feasible, other major obstacles
would remain. One of the difficulties in organizing service sector
employees is that their jobs are highly diverse, ard therefore require
equally diverse organizing and representational strategies. Rapid growth
has occurred (anrd will continue) in both relatively high paying and
relatively low paying service jobs (Osterman, 1988; Loveman and Tilly,
1987). The educational and skill requirements of future jobs are
expected to rise. However, if current patterns continue, the
distribution of income will become more unequal as high paying blue
collar jobs disappear to be replaced by both higher paying professional
and technical jobs and lower paying unskilled service jobs (Johnston and
Packer, 1987). Only about thirty percent of blue collar workers
displaced from manufacturing jobs possess the skills and training they
need in order to obtain the newly created high skill jobs. Thus, they
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are likely to suffer significant income losses as sectoral shifts
cntinue (Cyert ard Mkery, 1987; c. f., Mishel and Teixeira, 1990).
The briefest glance at the dcharacteristics of new entrants into the
labor force over the next decade also indicates that old reresentational
strategies will be inadeuate to meet their needs ard interests. tile
the nmber of ne entrants will slow compare to the rate of the 1970s,
over four-fifths of the new entrants between now and the year 2000 will
be female and/or minority ard/or imnigrant (Jhnston and Packer, 1987).
These groups have traditionally had difficulty achievirg access to career
ladders and high status/high pay jobs, and therefore will need labor
organizations and strategies that help them get into these jobs aid
careers.
Moreover, the latest evidence suggests that mid-80's predictions of a
ccaming shortage of labor for a rming abundance of high-skill job were
extremely optimistic (Mishel and Teixeira, 1990). hus, effective
strategies representing service sector workers iust include the upgrading
of the quality of jobs open to women, minorities, immigrants, and other
workers who in the past would have aken lower skilled jobs in the
manufacturing sector. Specifically, this challernges worker
representatives to play a significantly larger and more visible role in
training and further development anisms that allow for upward and
lateral mobility within firm. In other words, labor organizations mist
find ways to minimize the dislocation that typically accmpanies
American-style flexibility at the workplace in which workers are more
likely than in northern Europe to be hired and fired rather than
retrained and redeployed. Promnting and helping to deliver educational
14
and training programs ad skills upgrading on the jb mrust be critical
crpornents of any effective representaticnal strategy for employees in
this sector.
In marry respects, the challenge of organizing these workers is
-cIparable to that faced by the emerging industrial nions in the 1930s.
Then, as rnw, the task was to inprove low wage jobs held by people with
little labor market poer who are outside the realm of traditional union
constituencies. There was then no natural economic law that preordained
manufacturing jbs to be low paying or lacking in career opportunities;
similarly, there is no preordained reason for this to be the case for
service sector jbs today. Now, as then, a productivity enhancin
strate on the part of labor and ianagemnt will be necessary to
increase the quality of these jobs and to ease new entrants' access to
them .
At the same time, the shift in jobs to the service sector will
continue to challernge the ability of unions to rrepsent highly skilled
professionals and technical employees. These groups will not be as
attracte d by traditional forms of collective bargaining, but will need
continuous labor market information, education and training services.
That is, just as the lower skilled service workers will have an
increasing stake in better organized and more stable internal labor
markets, so will the higher skilled employees need better organized (and
more information about) external labor markets. In Germany the
Metalworkers Union has recently embarked on a strategic campaign to
attract more professional employees by providing such consulting and
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information services, e.g., aong oxputer professionals. 1
Alternatively, smthing like a professional association mdel may
provide the best mechanism for representing these eployees' interests in
the U.S. At least in the short run, professionals will rned
organizations that provide individualized career develcpment services
that assure mobility across fires, rather than traditional firm-mpecific
collective bargain mecanis. (As Zax ard Ichniowski (1990) have
shown, the public sector experience illustrates that employee
associations existing before the enactment of collective bargaini
rights were relatively quickly transformad into bargainir organizations,
while it took employees who had not been members of such associations
much longer to gain collective representation. hat is, the association
model could eventually translate into a collective bargainir model , as
it did for teachers, nurses, police, firefighters, etc. in New York and
elsewhere. 
In sumnary, in order to address the changes in the structure of the
econmay and the workforce, unions will have to broaden their
constituencies by developing strategies that organize internal and
external labor markets in the interests of more continuous and high
quality employment for both high ad low skilled service sector workers.
certainly collective bargaining must contiume to play a significant role
in upgrading the status of low paying service jobs. Ioever, to be
successful in upgradin these jbs without significantly reducing
aggregate jcb growth, unions will need to help enhance employee skills
1 Based on a conversation between Kirsten Wever and Witich
Rossmann, Igmetall, Koeln, Septer 1990.
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(or human capital). To organize highly paid professionals in the service
and goods producirng sectors unions must go beycnd collective bargaininr,
addressirng the career and labor market information neds of these workers
on a more individualized and ocupatinal or professional basis. Put
differently, these challees imply both a more defcralized and a more
centralized approach to interest representation, placing more emphasis
both on skills develprent, administered deentrally on a workplace- or
even worker-specific basis, ard on career development and human resource
adjustment policies, administered at higher (state or regional) levels by
more centralized bodies. Unions minst becom the leading voice in
advocating a skills intensive competitive strategies at the firm and
industry levels and a human capital intensive ecnomic policy at the
local, state, and national policy making levels. In both instanos, this
means that labor organizations will have to anticipate and influence
management strategies for organizing work and new organizational
structures (and therefore also new techndlogies), rather than simply
reacting to management initiatives.
New Management Strategies and Oranizational Structures:
We have argued elsewhere that to address carqes in employer
strategies and human resource policies unions must significantly broaden
their own involvement at levels "above" and "belw' the level of
collective bargaining (Kochan et al, 1986). Let us briefly illustrate
what we mean by this, first at the "higher" strategic level and then at
the "lower" workplace level. In large organizations that can easily move
capital around, key decisions affecting worker interests are made by top
executives far remved from (above) the level of bargaining. This
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developent was reinforced in the 1980s by the growig influence of
firancial markets on corporate strategies and industrial relations. For
instance, takeover threats can lead firms to borrow heavily, which
increases their debt repayments and pressures them to acut jabs and wages
and to sacrifice long term investments in human resources. But the
arenas in which thes decisions are made carrt be influenrd by the
collective hargaining process or by other traditional methods of union
influence. To represent worker interests in these matters, uniorns mst
try new ways to shape strategic corporate policies. They must also
develop leverage in these arenas at an earlier point in the decision
making process than is typically possible in traditional collective
bargaining (in which fonnn managements have already reached these
decisions and seek only labor acceptanoe of them).
A variety of unions have attempted to influence corporate strategies
and governance arrargements. The airline industry has served as an
especially visible and active laboratory for such efforts. For instance,
experimentation with union representation on airline boards of directors
occurred at most of the major carriers. The unions at Eastern Airlines
have recently played a major role in constraining the CED of Eastern's
parent corporation (Frank Lorenzo of Texas Air) frum shifting further
assets to the airline's sister carrier, OCntinental. In the mid 1980s,
the unions at United Airlines were able to use financial ad strategic
leverage to reverse the diversification strategy of that carrier's parent
corporation. The auto industry has alsprooed a number of important
experiments with union participation in strategic decision-making. For
example, in the early 1980s the United Auto Workers union used its
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leverage with General Motors to insist that the GMQ-Tyota joint venture
(New United Motors Manufacturing Inc., or NHUC) be unionized ard hire
back former GM workers. More recently, the UAW worked with GM to plan,
design, and manage the newly formed Saturn Crparation.
These are just same of the more visible examples of increasirg union
willingness to experiment with strategies that involve them directly in
the strategic decision-maki processes heretofore left to management.
But two powerful factors continue to limit their scope ad potential for
diffusion. First, such experiments are only possible where unions are
already strong, and collective bargaining is highly centralized so that
the firm's strategic decision makers are not too far renoved from the
influence of top union leaders. The UAW could exert great leverage over
GM, for example, because it already represented all of GM's U.S.
production workers and bargained centrally with GM executives. Few other
U.S. unions boast such leverage and structural advantages. Second, U.S.
labor leaders are still quite divided as to the merits of this approach,
and thus they have made no concerted call for an expansion of labor's
role or influence in corporate decision-making and governance.
Therefore, while these examples illustrate the wide potential scope of
union influence above the level of collective bargaining (over basic
management strategies and organizational structures) they also point up
the enormity of the task of turning these experiments into standard
practice.
Managements have also begun to place increasing ephasis on gaining
flexibility and engaging in direct camrunication with workers at the
workplace. This suggests the need for greater union influence at the
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point of production, below the level of collective baraining (Kcan, et
al, 1984; Thcmas, 1990). Union leaders have nor had at least a d of
experiences with participation in work reform ard new technology
introduction (amt other things) and appear to be more pen than in the
past to these and other no ideas (Wever, 1989). But there is still no
consensus within the labor mavemnmt on how aggressive or sEuportive they
should be regarding such efforts. Yet whee participation has been
inpleented it has usually been well received by emplyees. In nonunion
cases, traditional organizirng drives have ternded to fail in unionizing
workers who hAve been exposed to these efforts. Once more, this suggests
that workplace innovations pose both challenges and opportunities for
union leaders interested in finding new ways to represent workers.
New manageent strategies and production imperatives often require
employee sacrifices in the form of wage cuts or freezes, contingent
compensation schemes or productivity erhanoements. As a result,
managements have beOrme more willing to share financial information
justifying these measures, and eager to cxmaunicate directly with workers
in order to explain and gain aceptarO for these changes. These direct
links have edged the unions out of a central mediating role they have
traditionally played. Tb avoid superficiality at this level, unions need
to play a more active role in designing and iplementig changes in the
organization of production and work, and articulating and representing
new short-term and long-term employee interests in these matters. As
noted above, one central cipnent of this strategy will be anticipatirn
the further trainin progras appropriate to dharging skills needs. his
approach has become ireasingly popular in Germany aver the past few
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years, and indeed has been under discussion in the union movemnt and
research ccraunities since the mid-1970s (Maase et al, 1975).
Experimentation in the auto, aerospace and tel eocmunications industries
illustrate that sare unions have begun to reognize the vital inprtane
of developinrg new roles at this level of eployment relations. Unions in
these idustries have negotiated jointly administered training and career
development furnds that are supplements to the specific training efforts
provided by eplayers.
In any case, while these innovations are all useful first steps toward
expanding labor's role in corporate affairs, a muh more fundamental
redesign of governance structures within corporations is called for. The
economic pressures noted above suggest the need for far more consultation
with and participation of workers and their representatives at all levels
of the organization, around a broader set of issues than are generally
covered in traditional collective baraining relationships. hey also
imply the breakdown of traditional lines of demarcation between different
bargaining units, between blue and white collar workers, and among
workers, supervisors, and middle managers. That is, employee
representative organizations will be called on to represent more diverse
interests than they have traditionally been able to do (in large part
because of the cnstraints of labor law) in the U.S.
As proposed by Adams (1985), Kochan ard MfKersie (1988), Weiler
(1990) and others, these changes may require forms of resentation and
participation that resemble European works councils more than American-
style collective bargaining. There is an active and lively debate
underway, both within the union movement and among managers and other
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irdustrial relations professionals and researders, c rnir the wisdom
and viability of these new forms of participation, roles for unins, ard
models of organizational governance (Wever, 1990). Over time, more
national union leaders voice cautious support for these irvations.
Lynn Williams, president of the United Steelw , for example, has
actively argued in favor of tryirq any or all of these nw aproades if
the circrmstares warrant. Others (~lin, 1989; Shanker, 1990) have
also argued that the future will require use of ore flexible forms of
worker participation and representation. In the context of the AFCIO's
strategy developmrent forum, the Cmittee on the Evolution of Work (CEW),
the unions' top leaders have been consulting with experts on works
councils and other new forms of workplace-specific representation, as
well as Employee Stock Owneship Plans and other mechanirs for gaining
greater influence in strategic corporate decision making. hat is, the
movement is irdeed considering new roles both "'below' and "above" the
level of collective bargainin. he CEW has also begun to consider a
variety of economic justifications (as well as ethical and socio-
political reasons) for playing a more substantial role in workplace,
strategic and national eorxnic plaringr (Wever 1989).2
Yet these exceptions point up the prevalence of the cautious, case-by-
case approach that still d inates aong most national union leaders. No
union has so far placed support for alternative forms of participation
2 his mxgraph oesnsiders a broader range of causes of union
decline and of alternative interest reprsentation laniis and
strategies than the AFL-CIO has been willing to identify itself with in the
past. It was tcxissioned of the AFL-CIO by the International Labor
Organization, and written while the author was Special Assistant to the
Federation's Secretary-Treasurer, Thomas R. Donahue.
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and representation in the center of its agenda for the future.
Meanwhile, pressures on unions to adopt these new roles will continue to
intensify. he managennt mcc ity already exhibits a consensus that
greater flexibility and greater eployee involverent in enterprise
decision making are neressary and desirable features of the "new
industrial relations." As a result, those unions that resist these new
roles (or that are too slow in adoptin them) will probably suffer more
rapid membership declines than those that take the lead in facilitating
the development of new forms of organizational goveance.
American Workers' Values and Exectations:
Finally, we come to the question of how unions can best respond to
the values and expectations of cnteporary workers. A strong faction
within the labor movement, represented by the Industrial Union Department
at the AF-CIO, believes that unions must attempt to overoume the
cultural and political constraints that have historically kept workers
from developing a deeper solidarity and ideological attachment to
collective representation. Indeed, the IUD's celebrated "Jobs with
Justice" campaign is premised on such ideas. 3 The evidence suggests,
however, that the search for an cverarhin working class identity is
likely to be no more successful in the future than it has been in the
past. Historians and theorists of different political orientations will
doubtless continue to debate precisely why it is that American workers
lack urean-style class consciousness or saoe other strong collective
ideology. But in any case the increasing diversity in the workforce
3 Based on a conversation between Brian Turner, IUD, February, 1988,
Washington, D.C., and Kirsten Wever.
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makes it even less likely that a single ideology can be fourd to bind
large numbers of workers together in the future.
It is true that labor has in the past shwn itself to be a social
movemnt capable of integrating and organizing specific gras, such as
immigrants on the East Coast and farmworkers on the West Coast. A
gurrent program organized by the AFCO ses to be suFoessfully signing
up associate members (more will be said below about this mebeship
category) ao hispanic workers in the Los Angeles area. Oher
hogen s groups of workers could provide similar cpportunities. But
any such potential for wdeeorkers' ideological ocmrtment and
loyalty to unions is most likely to appear in localized ooi4pational,
ethnic and cannmmity-based organizations, ard not in any unified national
movennt.
More than in other countries, American workers have always evaluated
unions on instrumental grounds-on their ability to address workers' key
job-related concerns. This urderlines the iportarx of Piore's argunent
in Chapter twelve that local union leaders mist iprove their performance
in delivering traditional union services and benefits. But cdanging
workers' perceptions of union instrtmentality on traditional dimensions
will not be enough. An even bigger challerne is to develop an organizing
agernda that does not rely on deseated job dissatisfaction as the
primary (or sole) rallying cry for worker mobilization.
Perhaps a model for going beyond job dissatisfaction in appealing to
new mebers can be founrd in the interesting motto used by the Harvard
Union of Clerical Workers in its recent organizing drive: "It's not
anti-Harvard to be pro-union." After a long struggle and an aggressive
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campaign against the union's organizing effort by Harvard managent, the
HUE built a canpaign theme arixd Harvard clerical ard technical
employees' right to have a voice in the decisions affecting them and to
be treated as valued nembers of the university rommmity and part of its
governanoe structure. By taking this aroacd the union captured the
support of workers who did not necessarily dislike their immediate.
supervisors and are proud of their identification with Harvard as an
institution, but who also saw the value in collective representation
regarding issues of imni iate jcb-related concern. Future efforts to
organize service and professional employees must capture the support of
workers with similarly mixed feelings and concerns. As noted above, they
must also articulate and represent workers' (in part still latent)
interests on non-traditional dimensions, such as skills reuirements and
career development structures.
The AFI-CIO and some of its member unions have developed pilot
progranrs to test non-exclusive representation and non-majority (or
associate) rmembership models. These programs provide mein ership options
for individuals who are not part of a bargaining unit where a union has
exclusive representation rights. Thus, mmbers in this category would
not necessarily leave the union if they changed jbs. Various unions and
the Federation now provide associate members services such as labor
market, legal, and consumer information and other forms of assistance
tailored to their individual and family needs. Other unions have
developed programs to provide health insurance coverage, individual
retirement accounts, credit cards, consmer disounts, career counselin
and training and educational programs, armong other things.
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These efforts represent the attempt to break out of the reactive model
in which unionization represents smething like a strategy of last
resort, appropriate only for workers o are deeply diatisfie d with the
conditions of their eployment. But ultimately they can only be a part
of a larger strategy that moves toward a ore oroerted, more centralized
melanisa for meetiz eployees' rnds outside the xontext of their
immediate places of work (c.f. H1ckscher, 1988).
FUEURECS
Even taken together, the experients alluded to above cannot in and
of themselves produce a resurger of the labor movement. In this
section we outline a set of prqpositions conoernir the conditions for
change in irdustrial relations and American society that we see as the
necessary foundation for a oerent vision and strategy that could
produce a notable revitalization of worker representation in the U.S. We
offer these ideas both as generalizable hypotheses on which to base
future research (including comparative researI) and as a call to debate
and, importantly, action amorng those who share our concern over the
disarray of the cnt orary American idustrial relations system. 4
1. The possibilities for successful union response to the
envirmomental pressures of the day are positively related to the
existence of a strong political party that views the labor ovement as
one of its primary constituencies.
In the U.S., the lack of a strong political alliance between labor and
a major political party and/or other major political interest groups will
4 hese hypotheses are cast broadly enough to be applied across the
advanced irdustrial world. However, it would be beyond the scope of our
arTment in this paper to try to do so here.
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ccntinue to limit the possibilities of a res en in worker
representation. Even while the New Demmratic Party has helped sustain
labor's influene in Canada (Bruce, 1989), the declining role of the U.S.
labor movement in the Deo=cratic Party (and, irneed, the weakening of the
Democratic Party itself) continues to constrain A erican labor union
power and influenoe.
To be suooessful, the U.S. labor movsnt will have to beomae more
overtly political. In the 1990s labor and/or other interest groups are
likely to return worker interests to the national agenda and try to shift
the "crompetitiveness" debates of the 1980s to public disoourse about our
society's overall values, corporate governance, living standards and
incore inequalities, and human resouroe development. ere already
exists a broad potential coalition atm various groups in American
society who share deep concerns about educational and training deficits,
environental and occupational health and safety issues, work/family
issues, growing economic inequities, and abrupt social dislocation and
job losses resulting fran corporate restructuring, takeovers and takeover
threats and other new strategies of finance capital. Whether labor
leaders can articulate and mobilize the latent support for addressing
these concerns, and whether the unions can mobilize political action
around these and other issues remains to be seen.
We think it likely that the first group to seize and forcefully
articulate this agenda will be able to play an important role in
marshallirg political interest and support fram large blocs of the
American workforce and voting population. If unions take the lead in
articulating these new interests, and do so in a fashion that presents a
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clear vision and a role for workers in the goveznaoe of the American
corporation and in the future clrnic strategies of the nation,
employees may see new and cnmpelling reasons to join unions.
2. The less unions or other institutions of woker representation are
able to influence business strategies, the greater will be union
nmrerehip decline.
This proposition goes to the limited reach of traditional American
forms of collective bargaini. Worker representation in the U.S. will
continue to suffer fran the failure of ourr industrial relations system to
provide forms of worker representation such as codetemin ati on, informal
consultation and information sharing (where business strategies can be
influenced), training and labor market information clearing houses and
individualized career developent services (which help organize external
labor markets) and works councils or similar institutions (which can
shape the reorganization of production and work). As long as our legal
doctrines and our custmary practices ontinue to center on traditional
forms of collective bargaining that enforce a strict separation of
management prerogatives ard union functions, unions will be poorly
positioned to cope with the forces that drive events in contenporary
organizations and eploynent relationships.
Any wmves in this direction, however, mist be su8ored by
furvaental changes in labor law, (Weiler, 1990) in the American
conception of the corporation, and in the legal doctrines that underlie
corporate governance. Long term shareholer interests in corporate
governance and management behavior mst be uerstood to depend on an
elevated role for human resrce interests and policies.
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3. Labor movements that are organized arcrzd exclusive
representation ard dcentralized collective bargairi aimed primarily at
raising wages and minimizing job dissatisfaction will otinue to
experienoe significant declines in union mrership.
This is an extension of the previous prqosition, suggesting that the
further removed union influence is frn the locus of power at the tcp of
the enterprise, the less able unions will be to constrain managerial
choioes. he American labor movement faces a peculiar structural
dilemma: it is at the same time too centralized and too deerntralized
(Katz and Sabel, 1985). As noted thro whut this paper, the interests of
American employees (especially in the expandli service sectors) call for
better organization of labor markets. Deentralized bargaining generally
represents only incumbent workers' interests in the status uo. It
addresses neither the dysfunctions in labor markets nor in skills
delivery Cranis (that is, workers' needs when they lose or change
jobs). As long as U.S. collective bargaining remains essentially
decentralized, this institution will be unable to influenoe structural
dislocations, and will therefore be further buffeted by their effects.
At the same time, American unions' dependence on contractual rather than
constitutional rights makes it politically difficulty for them to allow
for diverse local structures and prooesses of neatiation with
management whici might make it easier to re-organize work or production
and/or to upgrade and stabilize low-skill, low-wage jobs (Wever, 1990;
Thelen, 1987).
Moreover, as long as American unions are unable to take labor costs
out of cmpetition, they will continue to lose rribers because their
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mmbers will continue to lose jobs at a faster rate than otherwise
cmFparable bat lower paid rmnion workers. As noted above, workers terd
to withdraw omritment to unions once they lose their union jobs or
perceive unions as having lost the bargaini poer necessary to iprove
their inAMiate job cmditins. Grwing diversity in the U.S. workforce
is likely to weaken the effects of traditional appeals to working class
conscicusnss or solidarity. Human res agemet strategies that
diminish job dissatisfaction will waken traditional organizing appeals.
Both of these effects will be particularly visible ang the grawing
number of white collar and technical workers. This suggests the pressing
need for alternate sources of nmerbership ommitment which are capable of
reeting those employee interests that cannot be met by deoentralized
bargaining.
CONCUDIMNG S
In this paper we have argued that labor's decline stemI from
dynamics set in motion by intensified international competition; growing
conservatism in drestic politics and the administrtion of labor law;
employer strategies that are beyond the reach of American union
influence; and workers' perception of organized labor as an institution
that can do little more than help them address some aspects of job
dissatisfaction. Effective worker representation in the future will
require a cmbination of greater attentiveness to employees' diverse job-
arnd career-related interests; new bargain strategies that seek to
advance workers' earnings and living stadards thrgh productivity
increases; strategies that emphasize training and human resouce
developmrent; ad labor involvement in managerent policy making so as to
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influence the very premises of business strategies in their formative
stages. This is a tall order, anrd it is unlikely to be filled in the
current eoormic ard political envirYawt.
In the language of interest group theory, labor appears to be clinging
to the representation of obsolescent interests rather than articulating
the emergent interests of American working people. acking a coherent
vision of these eergent interests, and how they fit into the eprn1ic
and political interests of the nation as a whole, and insisting on loudly
defending old interests, organized labor consistently fails to mobilize
public support and/or to capitalize on its legitimate victories. (We
hasten to add that these "old" interests mist certainly play a role in
any modern labor strategy, but that they cannot form its centerpiece.)
But we believe that labor's recent reforms and experiments are not likely
to reap significant returns until accompanied by a clearly articulated
alternative strategy for labor.
The AFL-CIO has atteL ted to enhance its public image though the
formation of the Labor Institute for Public Affairs, and individual
unions have attempted to ally their organizing and bargaining campaigns
with popular public figures (like Jesse Jackson). Yet over the course of
the 1980s, from the 1981 air traffic controllers strike to the 1989-90
Eastern Airlines strike, the labor movement has consistently failed to
develop and publicize any convincing analysis of the problems they
confronted. As a result, the unions could not mobilize support around
the representation of the new interests spawned by these problems. The
Demcratic Party's failure along the same dimension surely contrihated to
the inevitable result, viz., that ecncaic onservatism went virtually
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III
unalleved in the past decade.
once again, a more hopeful historical analogy cam to minrd. In the
past, labor has been able to first experient with irrvative strategies
and later, when the envirorment was ore suortive, rally the public
support that provides the impetus for major institutional change. In the
early part of this oentury, for exale, Sidney Hillman and the
Amalganated Clothing Workers experen with inrvaticns in collective
brgainir~ and intr ed a form of inustrial uninim that, as Steve
Fraser (1983) put it, served as the "dress rehearsal" for the New Deal
irdustrial relations system. But it was not until the envirorment
changed in the 1930s, that John L. ewis and colleagues were able to
mobilize the social ard political resources necessary to achieve
resurgence for labor by articulating the limits of the AFL's traditional
interest representation meanisms. In the 1960s, the American
Federation of Teachers built an extremely successful public sector
organizing campaign by openly challenging the cautious approach to public
sector labor associations taken by its rival, the National Education
Association. Then, with the help of new labor laws at the state level,
the American Federation of State, County and Municipal Eplcyees and
other public sector unions took the public sector by storm when they
seized the possibilities for bargaining with public sector employers,
even without the right to strike.
But we find among the current slate of U.S. labor leaders no
individual (or union) willing or able openly and consistently to
criticize the limits of old forms of emplyee interest representation,
and to offer a cuherent alternative. We do not believe that such
32
__ _11___
III
leadership can exrge in a vacuum, or that it can single-hardedly produce
a turn-around in the fortunes of the American labor veant. But
neither can we envision the emrgenoe of such a transformation in its
absenre. Without a clear agenda for the future, however, labor will
neither be ready to react appropriately to a changed envirorm nt - if
and when it may emerge - or to play any significant role in spawning its
eergence. Instead, workers and their munions will continue to be
buffetes by dCani ercnmic and social events. As such, they can only
play a reactive, increasingly invisible role.
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